DRAFT

20 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

SUBJECT : Senate Select Committee, Public Statement on

The National Intelligence Estimates - B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capabilities

and Objectives

1. Action Requested: Approval of the attached letter to Senator Stevenson on the draft public statement. The letter

--confirms that the draft does not require changes to protect sources and methods.

- -- suggests changes for accuracy and clarity,
- --recommends that the Committee reconsider its decision to issue a public statement.
- 2. <u>Background</u>: The DCI commented on and made suggestions for changes to the final draft of the classified Committee report, attachment
- 2. All of the DCI suggestions were not accommodated in the final version of the Committee report, attachment 3.
- 3. <u>Staff Coordination</u>: The proposed letter to Senator Stevenson has been coordinated with the DDI, Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, IC Staff and the NIO/SP.
 - 4. Recommendation: That you sign the attached letter.

Robert R. Bowie

Attachments:

As stated For Release 2005/037/16 to CTA=RDP79M00095A000200040006-3

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The Honorable Adlai E. Stevenson Chairman Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20310

Dear Senator Stevenson:

The Sanitized draft statement on the Committee's recent report,
"The National Intelligence Estimates - B Team Episode Concerning Soviet
Strategic Capabilities and Objectives" has been reviewed as requested in
your letter of June 15, 1977. The draft statement does not require any
changes prior to public release in order to protect intelligence methods
and sources.

My letter of May 11, 1977 commenting on the classified version of the Committee's draft report, forwarded a number of suggested changes pertaining to accuracy and clarity of the report. Based on these suggestions the following changes are proposed in the unclassified Statement for reasons of accuracy and clarity.

--The last sentence of the third paragraph on page 4 of the draft Statement does not accurately describe the role of the DCI in the experiment. It is suggested that the two sentences of this paragraph be revised to read as follows:

"Responding to PFIAB initiatives, the new DCI, Mr. George Bush, consented to the experiment, and by June 1976.

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the PFIAB and the DCI had worked out ground rules for a competitive assessment experiment. The DCI, through his representatives, supervised the conduct of the NIE - B Team experiment, although members of the PFIAB were called upon to assist in the selection of members of the three B Teams."

--The second paragraph on page 6 of the Statement should make clear that the scope of the NIE did not call for coverage of many of the subjects which the Committee finds were not adequately treated. It is suggested that the third sentence be revised to read as follows:

"Because of its narrow purpose and scope, the NIE does not address the question of how Soviet strategic weapons development fits into the entire panoply of Soviet domestic, military, diplomatic, economic and other world efforts."

Finally, while I have appreciated having the views of the Committee on improving the preparations of national intelligence as conveyed in its classified report. I recommend that the Committe consider its decision to issue a public Statement on the report. I believe the Statement will serve to stimulate additional tendentious and largely uninformed debate on the estimating process, the estimating record and on current substantive issues. Some members of the three B-Teams may feel obliged to take issue with the explicit and implied findings of the Committee that they were subject to pressures of the political arenal or that their views were lacking in objectivity. I realize that the subjects covered in the

*The findings of a prestigious Congressional committee that policymakers and intelligence agencies are preoccupied with
strategic weapons could stimulate unconstructive controversy
about current US SALT TWO proposals.

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Committee's draft Statement not only are of importance to U.S. policy, but also were aired in the public media. Nevertheless, I believe the purposes of the Committee will be best served by not issuing a public Statement on its report.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER